Competition vs. quality in an industry with imperfect traceability - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Journal Articles Economics Bulletin Year : 2011

Competition vs. quality in an industry with imperfect traceability

(1) , (2)
1
2

Abstract

We consider an industry where firms produce goods that have different quality levels but firms cannot differentiate themselves from rivals. In this situation, producing low-quality generates a negative externality on the whole industry. This is particularly true when consumers cannot identify producers. In this article, we show that under a "Laissez Faire" situation free entry is not socially optimal and we argue that the imposition of a Minimum Quality Standard (MQS) may induce firms to enter the market.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
51355_20120329023950669_1.pdf (208.31 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Publisher files allowed on an open archive
Loading...

Dates and versions

hal-02643261 , version 2 (30-05-2016)
hal-02643261 , version 1 (28-05-2020)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-02643261 , version 1
  • PRODINRA : 51355

Cite

Elodie Rouvière, Raphael Soubeyran. Competition vs. quality in an industry with imperfect traceability. Economics Bulletin, 2011, 31 (4), pp.3052-3067. ⟨hal-02643261v1⟩
221 View
214 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More