From public to private safety regulation? : The case of negotiated agreements in the French fresh produce import industry

Abstract : Recent EU law of safety self-regulation by firms leads French fresh produce importers to negotiate with public authorities a collective self-monitoring safety agreement. Our paper is a case study of such an agreement in the Perpignan import market. Its actual design poses a problem of incentive alignment as long as it does not fit in with theoretical conditions. Empirical evidence and two complementary bodies of literature are used to deal with this issue. First, drawing on the literature of incentive schemes in teams, we show that implementing a collective discipline within the group is highly unlikely. Second, by turning to the literature of voluntary approaches to food safety we show that conditions for efficient enforcement are not met either. By introducing supermarkets as a third part we propose an enriched framework which allows a better understanding of why importers abide by the agreement and allocate resources in safety control.
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Jean Marie Codron, M'Hand Fares, Elodie Rouviere. From public to private safety regulation? : The case of negotiated agreements in the French fresh produce import industry. International Journal of Agricultural Resources Governance and Ecology, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd., 2007, 6 (3), pp.415-427. ⟨hal-01323247⟩

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